(The jury is present.)

THE COURT: Now we're going to turn to the questions of invalidity. And claims of a patent, as you know, can be found to be invalid, and Lawson contends that the claims here, all of them, are invalid.

Remember that a patent is presumed to be valid and, therefore, Lawson has to proved by clear and convincing evidence that a claim is invalid.

Clear and convincing evidence is evidence which produces in your minds an abiding conviction that the truth of the factual contentions are highly probable. In other words, it's different from a preponderance of the evidence standard.

For those of you who have been in criminal cases, it's not as high as beyond a reasonable doubt, but it's higher than preponderance and less than a reasonable doubt. And that instruction is No. 29 if you need to refresh your memory on it.

Lawson contends that all the claims are invalid for anticipation and are obvious. Those are the two grounds. And they are obvious in view or anticipated in view of prior art references. In particular, Lawson says that all of ePlus' claims are anticipated by certain prior art references and

contends they are obvious by prior art references.

The following things can be prior art:

- (1) Any product or method that was publicly known or used by others in the United States before the patented invention was made;
- (2) publications having a date more than one year before the filing date of the patent;
- (3) any product or method that was in public use or on sale in the United States more than one year before the patent was filed;
- (4) any patent granted on an application for patent by another person filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for the patent.

Lawson contends that the following, each one of them, are prior art that anticipates. Now, there's a difference between their contention of what is prior art that anticipates the patent and what is prior art that makes the patent obvious. And this is the prior art for purposes of anticipation. And that is what they call the Fisher RIMS system and also U.S. Patent number, what's been called the '989 patent.

EPlus disputes that any of those are prior art or that any of these anticipate the asserted claims. It is up to you to decide what is or isn't prior art in accord with instructions that I give you.

Both the parties have reviewed parts of the '683 patent that use the term "incorporation by reference." I think it's early in the specification. Incorporation by reference is a legal phrase that allows a patent applicant to make any other document become part of the patent application in such a manner that the incorporated document can be considered to be part of the patent application just as if incorporated documents have been fully set out in the application.

So if I incorporated something by reference,
I say, "I incorporate this by reference with this."

And I have that written in here. Everything that is
on this piece of paper now becomes part of that piece
of paper without having to retype it and put it all in
there. That is simply what incorporation by reference
means.

Now, on the topic of anticipation, we begin with the premise that a person cannot obtain a patent if someone else already has made an identical invention. So, simply put, the invention has to be new. An invention that is not new or novel is said to be anticipated by prior art.

Under the patent laws, an invention that is anticipated is not entitled to be patented at all. To prove anticipation, Lawson must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the claimed invention is not new. In this case, Lawson contends that each of the claims of the ePlus patents are anticipated. To anticipate, each and every element in the claim must be present in the single item of prior art.

So looking at what Lawson has said is the prior art, all right, you've got the Fisher RIMS system. First, you have to find what the Fisher RIMS system is. Go look at it. And then you have to decide is each and every element in a claim present in a single item of that prior art.

Same thing with the '989 patent. Get the '989 patent. You've heard what they say about it all. You know what their arguments are. The issue is, is each and every element in a claim present in the '989 patent? And you just do that claim by claim.

Anticipation, therefore, cannot be established by combining two or more items of prior art. You can't do that. Now, that's different than in obviousness. In obviousness, there is an argument for combination, but in anticipation, it all has to be in one document or it doesn't anticipate or in one of the things that I have told you is prior art.

In determining whether every one of the elements of the claimed invention is found in the

alleged prior art, you should take into account what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have understood from his or her examination of the prior art reference.

In other words, what would a person of ordinary skill in the art have concluded from viewing the '789 patent, once you find it, and the Fisher RIMS system, once you determine what you're going to do with that.

In determining whether a single item of prior art anticipates a patent claim, you should take into consideration not only what is expressly disclosed in the particular item of the alleged prior art, but also what inherently resulted from its practice. This is called inherency, and a party claiming inherency must prove it by clear and convincing evidence. To establish inherency, the evidence must make clear that the prior art either necessarily resulted in the missing descriptive matter and that it would be so recognized by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time that patent application was filed. And you just keep those instructions in mind and apply them to each anticipation that you have before you.

Now, Lawson contends that all of the claims of the ePlus patents were anticipated because the

invention defined in those claims were publicly known by others in the United States before they were invented by the inventors. The inventions defined by the ePlus patent claims were invented on August 10, 1994.

A patent claim is invalid if the invention defined in that claim was publicly known by others in the United States before it was invented by the inventors.

Lawson also contends that all of the claims of the ePlus patents were anticipated because the inventions defined in those claims were publicly used by others in the United States before they were invented by the inventors or they were publicly used in the United States more than one year before the ePlus inventors filed their application on August 10, 1994.

A patent claim is invalid if the invention defined in that claim was publicly used by a person other than the patentee in the United States before it was invented by the patentee or was publicly used by anyone in the United States more than a year before the effective filing date of the patentee's patent application.

An invention is publicly used if it is used

by the inventor by a person who is not under any limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor. The absence of affirmative steps to conceal is evidence of a prior use; however, secret use by a third part is not public use. If the public use was an experimental use performed in order to bring the invention to perfection or to determine if the invention is capable of performing its intended purpose, then such a use does not invalidate the claim.

Now, oral testimony alone, the lawyers referred to this, is just not enough to establish the existence of a prior public use or knowledge by clear and convincing evidence.

Generally, oral testimony of prior public use or knowledge must be corroborated in order to invalidate a patent. Corroboration simply means supported.

Documentary or physical evidence that is made contemporaneously with the inventive process provides the most reliable proof that the alleged prior art inventor's testimony has been corroborated.

If you find that Lawson has not corroborated the oral testimony that they rely on to show prior public use or knowledge with other evidence, then you

are not permitted to find that the subject of that oral testimony qualifies as prior public use or knowledge for purposes of invalidating one or more claims of the patents-in-suit.

If evidence is presented for purposes of attempting to corroborate oral testimony that alleges invalidity, then you have to determine whether this evidence, in fact, properly corroborates the oral testimony. So in other words, if somebody said, well, it was publicly known or publicly used or it or there was knowledge of it, and that's the oral testimony, then you have to look is there any other evidence that backs that up. If there isn't any other evidence that backs it up, that's all there is, then you can't consider that as proven by clear and convincing evidence.

So you look and see what else is the other evidence to corroborate it. And in looking at that other evidence and whether you should consider it, you decide what's the relationship between the corroborating witness and the alleged prior user; what's the time period between the event that's being used to corroborate and the trial; what's the interest of the corroborating witness in the subject matter of this suit; any contradiction or impeachment of the

witness's testimony; the extent and detail of corroborating witness's testimony; the witness's familiarity with the subject matter of the patented invention and the alleged prior use; probability that a prior use could occur considering the state of the art at the time; and the impact of the invention on the industry, and the commercial value of its practice.

Lawson also contends that all of the claims of the ePlus patents were anticipated because the inventions defined in those claims were publicly sold or offered for sale more than one year before the ePlus inventors filed their application on August 10, 1994.

A patent claim is invalid if, more than a year before the patent application date, an embodiment of the claimed invention was both (1) subject to commercial offering for sale in the United States and (2) ready for patenting. They have to prove that by clear and convincing evidence. That is, Lawson does.

An invention was "on sale" if the claimed invention was embodied in the thing sold or commercially offered for sale. It is not required that a sale is actually made. The essential question is whether or not there was an attempt to obtain

commercial benefit with the invention.

sir?

In order to be on sale, the invention claimed in the patent must have been ready for patenting at the time of the alleged offer for sale is made. An invention is ready for patenting either when it is reduced to practice or when the inventor has prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention sufficient to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to make use of the invention. The claimed invention is ready for patenting when there is reason to believe it would work for its intended purpose.

Lawson also contends that all of the claims of the ePlus patents were anticipated because the inventions defined in those claims were described in a printed publication that was published either before the inventors made the claimed inventions, that is on August 10, 1994, or more than one year before they filed those claims. That would be before August 10, 1993.

MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, may we approach,

THE COURT: What?

MR. ROBERTSON: May we approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

(The following sidebar conference is begun:)

MR. ROBERTSON: Correct me if I'm wrong, but this should be out now since the RIMS brochure is no longer anticipatory.

THE COURT: Would you speak into the microphone. What should be out?

MR. ROBERTSON: This instruction because the only printed publication I thought that was being alleged was the RIMS brochure.

MS. STOLL-DeBELL: This is what I was trying to say yesterday. This needs to go in because TV/2 general information manual and the TV/2 brochure qualifies as prior art under this section. So I had talked about putting anticipation.

MR. McDONALD: Just to be clear, they are not only anticipatory references, but they are prior art references because they are printed publications.

THE COURT: No, they don't go in here. This is anticipation.

MR. McDONALD: They have to be explained somewhere.

THE COURT: That doesn't count. You don't just do somewhere. You have to do it for a particular purpose. What do you all think? Most people don't deal with these things the way you-all did. You left an awful lot, both of you did, of instruction in here

that doesn't need to be here. You don't have any evidence on half of it. It's just ridiculous.

If this has any applicability, it goes in obviousness; is that right?

MR. McDONALD: That would be right.

THE COURT: Do you agree with that?

MR. ROBERTSON: Yes.

THE COURT: I'll change it and put it there.
All right.

(The sidebar conference is concluded.)

THE COURT: Now, I think at one time you-all heard in the opening argument that Lawson also relied on the printed publication rule as respecting anticipation. They don't do that anymore. And so what I just said about claims of the ePlus patent were anticipated because they were described in a printed publication before the invention or a year before, that doesn't apply because that's not part of the case anymore. I will deal with that topic in obviousness.

Lawson also does contend, though, that all of the claims of ePlus' patents were anticipated by a patent that issued from a prior patent application. A patent may be prior art to a patent claim even if the patent issued after the filing date of the patents-in-suit. This occurs when the patent

application for the earlier patent was filed by another person before the subject matter of the patents-in-suit that was invented. In this case, the prior art patent is the '989 patent. And ePlus, of course, does not admit that the patent anticipates the ePlus patents-in-suit and disputes that the '989 patent is prior art.

Now, we're going to turn to obviousness.

Another theory of obviousness or invalidity, excuse me, is obviousness. And a claimed invention is invalid as obvious if it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art of the claimed invention at the time the invention was made.

Unlike anticipation, which allows consideration of only one item of prior art, obviousness may be shown by considering more than one item. So in anticipation, there's no combination issue. It all has to appear in a single item of prior art or it's not proved by clear and convincing evidence.

And obviousness can be found by clear and convincing evidence, as I'll tell you later, that the combination renders it obvious.

The following factors have to be evaluated to determine whether Lawson has established by clear and

convincing evidence that the claimed inventions are obvious.

Now, before we go into that, let me tell you that Lawson contends that a combination of two or more of the following is prior art that renders obvious the asserted claims here, and they consider all of the claims are obvious.

One is the Fisher RIMS system. One is the '989 patent. Another one is the so-called RIMS brochure, the kind of purple thing that was attached to the trademark application, the TV/2 general information brochure, the TV/2 brochure, and the TV/2 system.

EPlus disputes that any of those are prior art or that any of them, if prior art, even render obvious the claims. And you have to decide what is the prior art.

So what are you going to take into account in establishing and deciding whether Lawson has established by clear and convincing evidence that the claimed inventions are obvious?

- (1) The scope and content of the prior art relied upon by Lawson;
- (2) the difference or differences, if any, between each claim of the ePlus patents that Lawson

contends is obvious and the prior art on which Lawson bases its assertion of obviousness;

(3) the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention of the ePlus patents were made. That's August of 1994.

Additional considerations, if any, that indicate that the invention was obvious or not obvious. Each of those factors have to be evaluated, although they may be analyzed in any order, but you must perform a separate analysis for each of the claim. And obviousness, as I said must, be proved by clear and convincing evidence, obviousness.

You should analyze whether there are any relevant differences between the prior art and the claimed invention from the viewpoint of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. So your analysis has to determine the impact, if any, of such differences on the obviousness or non-obviousness of the invention as a whole and not on merely some portion of it.

In analyzing the relevance of the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, you do not need to look for precise teaching in the prior art directed to the subject matter of the claim. In other words, it doesn't have to say, Do this, do this,

and do that.

You may take into account the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have employed in reviewing the prior art at the time of the invention.

Importantly, a claim is not proved obvious merely by of demonstrating that each of the elements was independently known in the prior art.

Most, if not all, inventions rely on building blocks long since uncovered, and claimed discoveries almost of necessity will likely be combinations of what is already know.

Therefore, you should consider whether a reason existed at the time of the invention at issue here that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the art in the relevant field to combine the known elements in the way the claimed invention does. The reason could come from the prior art, from the background knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, from the nature of the problem, the market demand, or common sense.

Again, you must do it on a claim by claim basis.

The determination of whether a claimed invention is obvious is based on the perspective of a

person of ordinary skill in the art. That person is presumed to know all the art that you have determined to be reasonably relevant. That is, that you find is prior art. And that person can use common sense to solve the problems.

Now, there are factors indicating obviousness that you should take into account. You must also consider certain factors which, if established, may indicate that the invention would not have been obvious, as well.

MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, I think you misspoke. You said there are factors that are indicating obviousness. I think it's factors indicating non-obviousness. I just wanted to make sure of the title there.

THE COURT: I didn't read the title. They don't read the titles into this.

MR. ROBERTSON: I'm sorry, sir.

THE COURT: I didn't read the title. I never do. But I'll be clear. Let's start again.

You have to also consider certain factors, which, if they are proved or if they are established, may indicate that the invention would not have been obvious. And no factor alone is dispositive, and you must consider the obviousness or non-obviousness of

the invention as a whole.

So what do you consider there?

- (1) Were products covered by a claim commercially successful? That is, were products that were covered by the claim in the patent commercially successful due to the merits of the claim invention rather than due to advertising, promotion, salesmanship, or features of the product other than those found in the claim?
- (2) Was there a long felt, but unresolved, need for a solution to the problem facing the inventors, which was satisfied by the claimed invention?
- (3) Did others try, but fail, to solve the problem solved by the claimed invention?
  - (4) Did others copy the claimed invention?
- (5) Did the claimed invention achieve unexpectedly superior results over the closest prior art?
- (6) Did others in the field praise the claimed invention or express surprise at the making of the claimed invention?
- (7) Did others accept licenses under the ePlus patents because of the merits of the claimed invention?

Now, Lawson also contends that the claims in the ePlus patents were obvious because the invention defined in those claims were described in a printed publication that was published before the inventors made the claimed invention on August 10, 1994, or more than one year before the inventors filed their U.S. Patent application on August 10, 1994.

A patent claim is invalid if the invention defined by that claim was described in a printed publication before it was invented by the patentee or more than one year prior to the filing date of the patent-in-suit.

A printed publication must be reasonably accessible to those members of the public who would be interested in its contents or who would most likely use it to qualify for a printed publication within the meaning of this instruction.

An alleged prior art reference is reasonably accessible upon a satisfactory showing that the document was disseminated or otherwise made available to the extent that persons ordinarily skilled in the art exercising reasonable diligence can locate it. It is not necessary that the printed publication be available to every member of the public, thus publications may include not only such things as

books, periodicals, and newspapers, but also publications that are not widely available to the public such as trade catalogs, journal articles, and scholarly papers that are distributed or available to those who are skilled in the art.

The information must, however, have been maintained in some form, such as printed pages, typewritten pages, magnetic tape, microfilm, photographs or photocopies.

For a printed publication to render a claim obvious, it must. When read by a person of ordinary skill in the art, expressly or inherently disclose what? The combination?

You know, this is why I asked you to do these things, and you didn't do them. It's not right as it's printed. If you can't tell me now how to correct it, I'm striking the whole instruction.

MR. McDONALD: I think that first sentence of that as last paragraph can just be deleted. Then you can just pick it up from there. I think that's all you have to do is take out that one sentence.

MR. ROBERTSON: I disagree.

THE COURT: Surprise, surprise.

MR. McDONALD: I think we would agree the whole last paragraph is unnecessary.

THE COURT: All right. It's out. Okay.

All right, ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to what you do when you leave here, and it's going to be up to you as to how you handle it.

When you retire to your jury room to begin your deliberations, you elect one of your members to act as the foreperson. And that foreperson will preside over your deliberations and be your spokesperson here in court.

Your verdict has to represent the collective judgment of the jury. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree to it. In other words, your verdict must be unanimous.

It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to deliberate with one another with a view toward reaching an agreement if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for himself or herself, but do that only after you impartially consider it with the evidence in the case along with your fellow jurors.

In the course of your deliberations, don't hesitate to change your opinion if you think you're wrong and if you think somebody else is right. But don't surrender your honest convictions merely for the sake of returning a verdict or because of the opinions

of other jurors are different than your own.

And remember at all times you're not partisans; you are the judges. You are the judges of the facts in this case. And your sole interest is to seek the truth from the evidence that is received during the trial.

Keep in mind your verdict must be based solely on the evidence and the law, that nothing you've seen or heard outside can be considered.

Nothing I've said and done during the trial is intended to suggest to you in any way what I think your verdict to be. That's up to you.

Nothing in these instructions is intended to suggest what your verdict ought to be. Nothing in the verdict form is intended to do that. They are all offered to help you along the way.

Now, the verdict form is fairly straightforward. You'll remember that they started, when Dr. Weaver testified, ePlus presented its claims of infringement in accord with certain configurations. So you have got configurations 1 through 5 that you have to decide here.

Looks like that you have a lot more to do than perhaps you do, but in order to make sure that you focus on what you are to focus on and we

understand what you have decided, we've determined that this is the best way for you to record what you do.

So when you have reached your unanimous verdict on whether configuration 1, which is defined here, infringes Claim 1 of the '516 patent, you check yes or no, whichever your unanimous verdict is.

Then you go to '516, Claim 6, yes or no.

Then you go down to configuration 2, and it's yes or no, whichever your unanimous result is for the patent that's alleged to infringe. And that configuration is alleged to infringe two claims of the '683 patent.

And then there are six claims of the '516 patent, and one claim of the '172 patent.

And then there's configuration 3, configuration 4, configuration 5, and then you've got infringement.

And then you turn to invalidity.

Remember that the burden of proof on this part, that is infringement, is different than it is for this next part, Roman numeral 2, validity.

Then: Do you find that Lawson has proved by clear and convincing evidence that any of the following claims are anticipated by the Fisher RIMS

system? And you check off yes or no depending on what you unanimously agree upon.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that any of the following claims are anticipated by the '989 patent? Same thing. And I'm not going through it all.

And then you get to obviousness. And obviousness is a little different. Do you find that Lawson has proved by clear and convincing evidence that any of the claims are obvious in light of the combination of (1) either the RIMS system, the RIMS brochure and/or the '989, and (2) either the TV/2 system or the TV/2 brochure and/or the TV/2 general information, Claim 3, yes or no.

If you answered yes, then you put in here, the next line down, what combination was it you found?

Mr. McDonald, when he was making his argument slipped. He said that you should just fill in here RIMS and TV/2 if that's what you found. Well, that's not right. You have to fill in which ones of these combinations listed in here if you find any combinations. If you answered yes, you check yes, and then you write down for us which one, combination or combinations, you found. And you have to be unanimous as to the combination. So you could not, for example,

come back with a verdict that said half of you believe it was the '989 patent and the TV/2 general information manual, and the other half of you find it was something else. You have to be in agreement and unanimous agreement on any alleged obviousness reference.

Then you do that for each of the claims that are listed in subparagraph (c)(1) through whatever it is, 12.

And then the verdict form, when you've got it, it's signed by the foreperson and dated, and you bring it back here. You tell us when you have got a unanimous verdict.

Now, how you proceed from this point on -one other thing. If during your you deliberations it
somehow is necessary for you to communicate with the
Court, do you that by sending a note signed by the
foreperson, or all of you, or some of you if the
foreperson doesn't want to sign it, and I will then
communicate with the lawyers and respond to you either
in writing or ask you to come back in here and give
you a response.

Please bear in mind that when you give us a note, if you do, we don't ever need to know how you're divided on the issue if you are divided. We don't

want to know we're divided 4 to 4 or 3 to 5 or whatever it is. All we need to know on the numbering is when you have got a unanimous verdict.

Now, what you do from this point on is on your schedule. You let us know. You can deliberate and you can stay for a while in the evening if you want do that. If you want to come back tomorrow, what is it now? 4:00 o'clock. If you want dinner, you need to let us know about an hour ahead of time so we can get you a meal.

About the best we can do is pizza, but if somebody has some special dietary requirement, we'll try to find something for you and won't make you eat pizza.

You-all just tell us what you want to do and you're on your own schedule. And I'm not suggesting in what I've said how long you should deliberate. That's all up to you.

Any requests for additional instructions or any objections to the instructions that were given?

MR. ROBERTSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Other than what was in the charge conference, which were preserved.

MR. McDONALD: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

1 Ladies and gentlemen, we'll send you the 2 verdict form. We'll send you a copy of the instructions. I'm going to have to have a couple 3 modifications made that I made on them, but it won't 4 take long. You'll get all of the evidence. 5 6 You're going to have a computer; is that 7 right? MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, Your Honor. 8 9 THE COURT: And what is it that they are going to do with the computer? 10 11 MR. ROBERTSON: They can play the 12 demonstrations that Dr. Weaver offered. 13 THE COURT: How do they do that? Is it a CD? MR. ROBERTSON: The computer is all set and 14 15 ready to go. Just turn it on. Mr. Neal is going to learn how to do it and he'll be able to tell the jury. 16 THE CLERK: God help us. 17 THE COURT: No, help them. 18 All right. We'll send the evidence back to 19 20 You-all can go ahead. Thank you very much. We you. will await your decision. 21 22 (The jury begins deliberation at 4:10 p.m.) 23 THE COURT: Have you got a list of exhibits 24 that are going back? 25 MR. MERRITT: Your Honor, we have a list of

the plaintiff's admitted exhibits. I believe Mr. Carr 1 2 has a list of the defendant's. Everybody has compared notes on them. I believe we are in agreement on what 3 should go back. 4 THE COURT: All right. How are you going to 5 6 mark what should go back? 7 MR. CARR: We each put into binders the ones that are going back. 8 9 THE COURT: How are we going to put it in the 10 record? 11 MR. CARR: We can read it into the record 12 with Ms. Daffron. THE COURT: What I don't want is -- it's not 13 as much a problem with civil cases, but I don't want a 14 Lentz problem. Do you know what that is? 15 MR. CARR: Yes, sir. Mr. Neal has pointed 16 that out. 17 THE COURT: All right. You dictate it into 18 19 the record then. 20 MR. MERRITT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: All right. Now, on the 21 instructions, I'm going change 30A by taking out 22 23 paragraph 3. 24 On 37, I'm changing the last paragraph by

deleting the word "either," the next to the last word

25

in the third line from the bottom, and instead of putting in "Johnson," I'm going to put "the '989."

That's a hangover from when there were more than one patent references there.

Then on No. 36, in the second line I've changed the word "anticipated" to "obvious." In the third paragraph, third line from the bottom of that paragraph I took out -- no, I didn't take it out. I thought I did, but I didn't. Sorry.

And then I took out -- excuse me. On the third page of that instruction, the entire last paragraph on your agreement.

With those changes, those will be the instructions that will go back to the jury. Is there anything else we need to do?

MR. ROBERTSON: Not from my perspective, Your Honor.

MR. McDONALD: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Counsel will remain available to deal with any questions that there are.

THE CLERK: Judge, I hate to bother you, but we have two questions about the exhibits. Maybe we have to wait until the jury comes back.

THE COURT: Wait just a minute. Take this to Ms. Hooper and have her change the jury set. Leave

mine like they are. Have her change the jury set and bring that back here, if you would.

What's the question?

THE CLERK: The set of exhibits that's going back to the jury, you may have to make a decision depending on what happens. So we can retain them.

They may want to clean up something. They put all the exhibits in the record. Normally we would return exhibits to counsel.

Do you want to keep them in this instance or do you want to just keep the exhibits that went back to the jury?

THE COURT: I am going to let all of the exhibits go back to counsel. Once we've got in the record (A) what is admitted, and (B) what has gone back to the jury, we know that, and it's up to counsel to faithfully preserved those. And the plaintiff will keep the plaintiff's and the defendants will keep the defendant's. Or you-all can charge one or the other with the responsibility and pay them rent or moving fees or whatever you need to pay.

Tomorrow I want somebody to come to my office and haul away all of the paper and trees that you've killed so I don't have to put up with it anymore.

THE CLERK: I will await the jury

instructions, and I will get the exhibits back to the 1 2 counsel. THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess. 3 There's nothing else we need to do now because we 4 don't have any willfulness trial; is that right? 5 6 MR. ROBERTSON: That's right, Your Honor. 7 MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Now that you've done this 8 9 exercise, do you think there's a reason why the chief 10 people of each side ought not go down and talk to -who was it, Judge Dohnal or Judge Lauck? 11 12 MR. MERRITT: Judge Dohnal. 13 THE COURT: And talk to Judge Dohnal and see 14 if you can compromise? Or do you still want to beat heads against each other and give Mr. McDonald a 15 16 Mercedes and give Mr. Robertson a BMW? 17 MR. ROBERTSON: I have a Ford 150 truck. THE COURT: You want a Ford 150? 18 THE CLERK: He says he has one. 19 20 THE COURT: You-all ought to think about that and decide. If I were you, I'd be trying to work out 21 a compromise that didn't result in a total wipeout. 22 23 It's particularly risky for Lawson. 24 All right.

25 (Recess taken.)

(The following is dictated into the record by the attorneys:)

MR. MERRITT: The following are Plaintiff's Exhibits that are being sent back to the jury to use during its deliberations.

PX 1 through 11, inclusive, PX 13, and from now on instead of prefacing them with PX, I'll simply read the number. Each of these is preceded by a PX: 25, 32, 38, 43, 97, 98, 101, 103, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 117, 118, 127, 129, 131, 136, 149, 150

MR. CARR: 150 was supposed to have been redacted. Has that been done?

MR. MERRITT: Let's put a mark next to that question and I'll doublecheck that after I finish with the list. PX 150 we're going to go back and check for redaction.

153 is next, 154, 155, 156, 157, 170, 173,

188, 190, 191, 202, 208, 211, 212, 215, 216, 219, 225,

226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 234, 237, 238, 239, 276, 280,

317, 319, 320, 325, 337, 361, 363, 364, 367, 368, 374,

376, 379, 380, 417, 448, 464, 470, 482, and now we

have a series of exhibits that have some sub numbers

beginning with PX 501B1, that's B as in boy, PX 501D1,

D as in dog, PX 501I, PX 501L as in lion, PX 501M,

PX 501N, PX 501R.

And finally '516, 521, 522. That concludes the PX list. And if we could go off the record for a minute before I forget and let me check on the status of PX 150.

MR. CARR: Let me read mine, then we'll look at it together. The defense exhibits going back to the jury are DX 7, DX 45, DX 61, DX 62, DX 96, DX 105, DX 107, DX 117, DX 125, DX 126, DX 133, DX 139, DX 140, DX 141, DX 207, DX 211, DX 212, DX 213, DX 230, DX 400, and 402.

(Recess taken.)